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ABSTRACT 
Current debate and policy surrounding the use of genetic editing in humans often relies on a 
binary distinction between therapy and human enhancement. In this paper, we argue that this 
dichotomy fails to take into account perhaps the most significant potential uses of CRISPR-Cas9 
gene editing in humans. We argue that genetic treatment of sporadic Alzheimer’s disease, breast- 
and ovarian-cancer causing BRCA1/2 mutations and the introduction of HIV resistance in humans 
should be considered within a new category of genetic protection treatments. We find that if this 
category is not introduced, life-altering research might be unnecessarily limited by current or 
future policy. Otherwise ad hoc decisions might be made, which introduce a risk of unforeseen 
moral costs, and might overlook or fail to address some important opportunities. 
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Gene editing with subsequent transplantation of human cells for treatment purposes has been 
technically possible for many years, but it was only with the introduction of CRISPR-Cas9 
technology in 2012 that it became affordable and precise enough to make widespread use in 
human medicine a realistic possibility. This led to growing interest in the ethical implications of 
this and similar technologies.  
 
Traditionally, public debate over gene editing in humans has proceeded on the basis that there is a 
dichotomy between therapy and enhancement, with the first generally being considered morally 
legitimate and the second being seen as more problematic. This dichotomy has historical roots in a 
very broad discussion about human enhancement in general. It can also be found in the academic 
literature, although here it has been subject to scrutiny and criticism.1–4 However, in the following, 
we will argue that the binary model (as well as some subsequent proposed modifications to this 
model) ignores a third category, genetic protection modifications, which covers repair of disease-
disposing genetic variants. Recognizing this category, we focus on what may be by far the most 
significant group of potential applications of gene editing technology. Genetic protection 
modification has features in common with both therapy and enhancement, and it therefore raises 
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important moral dilemmas. Here, we will illustrate this with the case of Alzheimer’s Disease, but 
the same dilemmas arise for many other genetic variants that are associated with disease. 
 
THE BINARY MODEL OF THE ETHICS OF GENETIC MODIFICATION 
Researchers are currently exploring the potential of CRISPR-Cas9 technology in the treatment of 
human diseases. There is ongoing research into genetic diagnoses, characterizations and potential 
future somatic or germline treatments of neurodegenerative diseases such as Alzheimer’s, 
Parkinson’s Disease, and diabetes, amongst many other diseases.5–7 Concurrently (but entirely 
unrelated to this research), the first in vivo editing and subsequent live birth of human embryos 
has been accomplished (and widely condemned8–11) in China. 
 
While policymakers and ethicists have long been aware of the need to set limits on this type of 
research and treatment, the advent of CRISPR-Cas9 has led to a push to reassess and make explicit 
previous guidelines on the topic. Both in debate and in policy surrounding the use of genetic 
modification, the issues have typically been separated into two categories: those raised by genetic 
therapy and those connected with genetic enhancement. The bifurcation can be observed in many 
international policy documents and reports, including the Oviedo Convention12  and documents 
issued by the Committee on Human Gene Editing,13  the Danish Ethical Council14  and the German 
Ethical Council.15   
 
In some respects, this distinction maps onto a much wider and older debate (both in policy and 
academic circles) over the difference between therapy and enhancement in general. The 
distinction has been used in reference to genetic enhancement since the late 1980s, when genetic 
enhancement was criticized by W. F. Anderson as being risky both medically and for society as a 
whole.16 While much of the existing work on the distinction is useful in defining the proper limits 
of genetic therapy and enhancement, there are limits to the applicability and usefulness of the 
literature when it comes to the unique ethical challenges presented by genetic treatments.  
 
To expand a little, previous work on the therapy/enhancement distinction was partly motivated by 
the need to define the proper scope of health care. In this work it was taken for granted that if 
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‘therapy’ could be defined, the scope of health care would thereby be clarified. With this 
approach, some of the traditional accounts did set effective limits on the obligations of physicians 
and the health care system in general.1,16 But while those limits are far from irrelevant to the case 
of genetic treatments, the traditional accounts failed to address some of the additional and 
unique ethical issues associated with genetic enhancement.  
 
Professional domain accounts are an example of this. They draw the line between therapy and 
enhancement by asking whether a treatment falls within the domain of the health profession in an 
actual cultural or societal context.1 However, while such accounts can be useful in delineating the 
boundaries between therapy and enhancement that exist in real health care systems, they fail to 
engage more deeply with what might be considered the ethically problematic questions about the 
status of genetic enhancements. They explain why genetic enhancements should not be 
undertaken in a public health care system, but they provide no basis for limiting or calling into 
question such treatments more generally. 
 
Genetic enhancement attracted ethical condemnation and legal bans long before the types of 
treatment we now see were even a realistic possibility. Perhaps, as Scully and Rehmann-Sutter 
have argued, the ethical objections were at least partly due to the longstanding hypothetical 
nature of the issue (something that is no longer the case, of course) and the wish to justify genetic 
therapy research and use by clearly separating it from enhancement issues.4 Still, an account of 
the therapy/enhancement distinction that provides a firm foundation for the ethical evaluation of 
enhancements per se (independently of debates about the scope of health care) is desirable, and 
perhaps necessary, as we enter a time where genetic enhancement treatments are no longer a 
science-fiction scenario. Concrete policy-decisions will surely need to be made, after all, not only 
about the scope of the health care system, but also about the ethical status and legality of genetic 
enhancements in general. 
 
The following seems to be the best candidate account: Genetic therapy is (best understood as) the 
treatment of actual diseases that prevent the individual from functioning normally. Enhancement 
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creates modifications designed to augment an individual beyond the scope of normal functioning, 
or to change traits in an individual that are not associated with loss of function. 
 
This distinction is based on the “normal-functioning” definition of disease described by Norman 
Daniels and James Sabin.17 In the wider therapy/enhancement debate it is recognized that the 
normal functioning account is challenged by preventative treatments. Generally, such treatments 
involve interventions in normally functioning individuals, so they do not aim at returning an 
individual to normal functioning. They appear, therefore, to be enhancements. This has led to 
attempts to modify the account so as to ensure that preventative measures such as vaccines are 
not considered enhancements. 
 
It is also important to point out that different ways of distinguishing therapy and enhancement 
exist, but historically the “normal functioning” definition of disease has been highly influential, and 
thus, a version of this definition is used here to define the two concepts. According to the “normal 
functioning” definition, a disease is defined in terms of features, or functions, in the individual 
which depart from “species-typical normal functioning”. On this definition, therapy is treatment to 
restore normal functioning, allowing the patient to re-access a normal range of opportunities, and 
enhancements are interventions that extend targeted traits or capabilities beyond the normal 
range. Based on this definition, it can be said that genetic therapies modify gene variants causing 
phenotypic expressions that are incompatible with species-typical normal functioning (i.e. are 
diseases). For example, a genetic treatment of sickle cell anaemia might be considered a genetic 
therapy. Sickle cell anemia is caused by a genetic variation in the beta-globin gene. The mutation 
causes abnormal shaping of the red blood cells. However, being heterozygotic for this trait is 
advantageous in regions with a high prevalence of malaria, as individuals without the trait 
experience increased morbidity and mortality.18 Caution is thus essential. Genetic treatments 
could offer protection for one disease, but increase the risk of other morbidities. Genetic 
enhancements involve the modification of gene variants associated with traits which, once 
improved, allow the individual to go beyond normal functioning. Such enhancement may, for 
example, improve the IQ of a normally functioning individual. 
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This binary distinction has gained traction in policy and popular understanding, and it has served 
as a functional tool to structure ethical decision-making. However, there is a risk that its simplicity 
fails to capture an important ethical ‘middle-ground’ containing interventions that cannot be 
described accurately in terms of therapy or enhancement. Taking this point up, we will argue that 
a third category, which we have named “genetic protection modifications”, is needed in order to 
understand the full range of future genetic interventions. Furthermore, we will argue that this 
third category is of special importance because it contains many of the most promising potential 
genetic interventions, including treatments for at least some forms of Alzheimer’s Disease. 
 
NOT ALL TREATMENTS FIT THE BINARY MODEL 
Some genetic variants do not in themselves cause disease, but they make an individual more likely 
to develop a disease. The treatment of such variants does not in itself constitute therapy, because 
the genetic variants do not represent a disease or prevent normal functioning. However, 
modifications to such variants should not be assessed as enhancements either, because they do 
not enhance the individual beyond normal functioning. The repair or modification of disease-
disposing variants is what we call “genetic protection modification”.  
 
An example can be used to illustrate the third category: An intervention to reduce the risk of some 
forms of Alzheimer’s Disease. This disease is a neurodegenerative disorder resulting in gradual 
decline in memory and cognitive function which ultimately leads to death. It is the most common 
form of dementia, accounting for more than 60% of all dementia cases, making it the most 
common cause of disability in the elderly population. Around 50 million people have Alzheimer’s 
Disease worldwide19  (expected to increase to 152 million by 205020).  
 
Alzheimer’s Disease has two forms: familial (fAD) and sporadic (sAD). Besides their hereditary 
differences, they differ in age of onset, which for fAD patients is before or around the age of 60, 
but for sAD patients is above 60 years. Thus, fAD is also known as early-onset Alzheimer’s Disease 
and sAD as late-onset Alzheimer’s Disease. fAD is a hereditary form of the disease that is caused 
by mutations in one of the three genes Presenilin1 (PSEN1), Presenilin2 (PSEN2) and Amyloid 
Precursor Protein (APP). Around 300 pathogenic mutations causing fAD have been identified in 
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one of these three genes.21 Individuals with one of these mutations are certain to develop 
Alzheimer’s Disease. Consequently, it can be said that the genetic variants associated with fAD 
represent a disease: they cause cognitive decline that restricts species-typical functioning. 
 
By contrast, sAD – which accounts for the majority of Alzheimer’s cases and has no clear sign of 
heritability – has been associated with a range of genetic risk factors which, in combination with 
environmental factors, confer an increased probability of developing Alzheimer’s Disease. These 
factors do not by themselves cause Alzheimer’s Disease, but they do increase an individual’s risks 
of developing it, and thus a sAD variant cannot accurately be described as a genetic disease given 
the definition provided above. Before genome-wide associated studies (GWAS) could be made, 
the APOE gene was the only known risk factor associated with sAD. However, GWAS studies have 
uncovered a number of other genes increasing a person’s risk of developing sAD, including the 
TREM2 gene. TREM2 encodes for the TREM2 protein, which plays an anti-inflammatory role in the 
brain. People with a mutation in this gene have threefold higher risk of developing sAD,22  because 
non-functional TREM2 is believed to lower the ability of microglia to clear amyloid beta from the 
brain.  
 
Several other genes, such as CLU, SORL1 and CD33, have been identified via GWAS as genetic risk 
factors (with varying degrees of risk) associated with sAD.23  The presence of these genes make a 
person more susceptible to sAD, especially in combination with environmental factors such as lack 
of sleep,24  alcohol consumption, poor diet25  and pollution.26  However, the main risk factors for 
sAD are age and genetics, so lifestyle and environmental changes will have limited success in 
preventing sAD. It is also worth noting that although the two types of Alzheimer’s Disease vary in 
age of onset and are associated with different kinds of risk, the resulting disease is the same for 
both, indicating that similar, if not the same, mechanisms are involved in the development and 
progression of the disease. 
 
The key point here is that having an fAD variant present in the genome is a disease in progress and 
this disease will, if it is not prevented from developing, restrict individuals from species-typical 
normal functioning. sAD, on the other hand, is associated with a set of genetic variants that 
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predispose the individual to disease. While these variants are linked to an increased risk of 
developing Alzheimer’s Disease, they are also found in individuals who never develop the disease. 
In other words, the variants are not completely ‘penetrant’ – a geneticist’s term describing the 
proportion (or likelihood) of individuals carrying a particular variant whose presence increases the 
risk that an individual will develop a disease without (alone) actually causing the disease. The 
modification, or repair, of variants like those involved in sAD fits into the third category of genetic 
protection treatments proposed in this paper. Under our proposal, genetic therapy treatments 
restore the normal function of a variant that will cause disease (full penetrance, typically 
monogenic diseases), whereas genetic protection treatments correct a genetic variant that makes 
the associated disease more likely to occur (reduced penetrance, typically multifactorial diseases). 
 
A CASE FOR THE POTENTIAL OF PROTECTION TREATMENTS 
CRISPR-Cas9 technology offers a whole new range of possibilities in genetic editing. Currently, the 
technology is used mainly in research settings, but it is anticipated that genetic modifications will 
be used in the future either for ex vivo therapy in combination with cell replacement therapies or 
(even) for in vivo modifications. The in vivo treatment holds great promise if delivery modes can 
be optimized, as long as the safety issues of gene treatment can be addressed. However, as with 
many other potential treatments, one of the hardest obstacles to overcome is a precisely targeted 
and efficient delivery of the gene edited cells to the diseased organs and target cells. In the 
specific case of treating Alzheimer’s Disease with CRISPR-Cas9, any treatment needs to reach 
affected cells in the brain. This introduces an additional challenge, because the brain is protected 
by the blood-brain barrier (BBB). 
 
The ex vivo approach, followed by cell replacement with non-diseased cells (gene-modified 
isogenic cells) would probably involve stem cells or at least neuronal progenitor cells being used 
for gene editing. Here the most obvious approach would be to perform patient-specific 
reprogramming of, for example, skin, adipose tissue or blood cells into induced pluripotent stem 
cells (iPSC).27 Subsequently, these could be modified using the CRISPR-Cas9 gene editing method. 
Using iPSCs would also create an opportunity to first select successfully gene-modified cells and 
then reproduce those cells, in principle infinitely.  Afterwards, extensive ex vivo quality control and 
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differentiation into the desired neuronal cell subtype before transplantation into the patient can 
be performed. While this approach allows unwanted off-target effects to be screened for, the 
main challenge would be to ensure the quality and efficient delivery of the gene-edited cells.  
 
Another approach would involve direct in vivo gene editing and direct delivery of CRISPR-Cas9 to 
the brain, targeting the individual cells. As mentioned above, the BBB makes this difficult, but even 
if the BBB can be passed through, other problems will need to be solved – problems with the 
distribution of the CRISPR-Cas9 complexes within the brain and the successful targeting of specific 
cells. One way to overcome these obstacles might be to use virally based delivery of the CRISPR-
Cas9 RNP complex.28 The non-pathogenic parvovirus, adeno-associated virus (AAV), seems to be 
an efficient vector for transgene expression in vivo and has shown promise in the treatment of 
brain disorders. It should be kept in mind that neurons within the brain are fully differentiated and 
non-proliferative. This makes it difficult to deliver virus-based CRISPR-Cas9 components in vivo. It 
also hampers successful transplantation and integration of ex vivo gene-edited cells into the 
existing brain network. Where in vivo gene editing is concerned, immunogenicity issues associated 
with the Cas9 protein need to be considered. The most commonly used homologs of Cas9 are in 
fact derived from Staphylococcus aureus and Streptococcus pyogenes, two bacteria to which most 
humans have pre-existing antibodies.29 Thus, other homologs of Cas9 may be needed, or it may be 
necessary to employ alternative strategies. Thus, both approaches require further study and 
development, especially where their off-target effects are concerned, although recent 
technological improvements have significantly lowered the risks here.  
 
WHY A PROTECTION CATEGORY, AND NOT A PREVENTION CATEGORY? 
The incidence of dementia (of which AD is the most common cause) is rising globally, and the 
number of people suffering from it is expected to continue to grow in the foreseeable future. It 
can cause serious emotional suffering and put financial pressure on patients, families and 
caregivers. It also generates significant societal costs: an estimated $818 billion worldwide in 
2015.20 Consequently, genetic protection modifications aimed at diseases such as sAD could assist 
efforts to relieve human suffering and allow resources currently being swallowed up by AD 
treatment to be used to support other societal benefits. Such modifications may be ready for use 
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in the near future. In itself, this highlights the need to accurately evaluate the ethics of treatments 
targeting gene variants predisposing to disease. We suggest that recognition of a third category of 
genetic protection modifications will help to ensure that the ethical evaluation is framed correctly. 
 
The third category should not be confused with existing suggestions in the literature that a 
“preventative” category should be added to the traditional therapy/enhancement 
dichotomy.2,30,31 In the larger therapy/enhancement debate, there has been a recognition that the 
normal functioning account used here is challenged by preventative treatments. Generally, it can 
be said that preventative treatments are an intervention in normally functioning individuals, and 
does not aim at returning an individual to normal functioning. Consequently, such treatments 
would have to be considered enhancements. This has led to attempts to modify the account in 
order to ensure that preventative measures such as vaccines are not considered enhancements. 
Eric Juengst’s and similar definitions of preventative treatment separate prevention from 
enhancement within the normal-functioning definition of disease, but these definitions fail to 
distinguish disease-disposing variants from genetic disease variants – a distinction that is 
fundamental to the genetic protection category proposed here. Thus, Juengst would classify 
treatments of both fAD and sAD as preventative on the basis that the treatment of both variants 
aims to delay or prevent the development of Alzheimer’s Disease. Instead we define genetic 
treatments of fAD as therapeutic because they address a disease in progress and classify genetic 
manipulations effected in response to sAD as protection modifications because sAD variants 
“merely” increase the risk of disease. 
 
The separation of genetic modifications into the three distinct categories of genetic therapy, 
protection, and enhancement is important if controversial cases are to receive rigorous ethical 
assessment. The range of potential genetic protection modifications is broad and varied. Of 
course, the fact that an intervention is a case of genetic protection does not in itself determine its 
ethical status. Nevertheless, recognition of this category serves to highlight a group of 
interventions that are different from therapy or enhancement in a morally relevant way. Our view 
is that genetic protection interventions should be assessed on their individual merits. Our concern 
is that, if genetic protection is not seen as a distinct category, their moral status may be 
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determined inaccurately as a result of their being classified either as enhancements or as 
therapies. The difficulty of making sound ethical assessments of genetic protection interventions 
can be illustrated with a recent and highly publicized example. Recently, He Jiankui and his team 
conducted human experiments that led to the birth of two genetically edited babies. He’s intent 
was to imbue the children with genetic resistance to HIV (leaving aside suggestion that He was 
aware of the potential cognitive benefits of editing the CCR5 gene).32,33  This experiment has been 
widely condemned. But, in the light of our triadic categorization it can be seen that some 
criticisms have been more valid than others. 
 
He and his team have been rightly criticised for their lack of understanding of safety and efficacy 
issues, and for lack of awareness of the wider negative implications of the intervention.34 The 
informed consent process they followed has been called into question, and there is general 
agreement that their work displayed a worrying disregard for ethical, legal, and policy norms on 
the clinical use of genetic editing treatments. 
 
However, He and his team has been further criticized for providing a human enhancement 
treatment to the children in question,8  and on our analysis this accusation is unjustified. After all, 
most people live their entire lives without contracting HIV, or even encountering circumstances 
where HIV-resistance would benefit them. This means that a genetic modification providing HIV-
resistance is more correctly categorized as a genetic protection modification: it seeks to remove or 
mitigate the effects of a genetic variant that predisposes an individual to develop a disease, much 
like a treatment that delays or reduces the likelihood of developing sAD, or entirely prevents it. 
This comparison of modifications aimed at sAD and HIV-resistance brings out a difficulty in the 
moral assessment of genetic protection modifications: it enables us to see that some protection 
modifications provoke the same moral worries as genetic enhancement (HIV protection), while 
others are superficially similar to genetic therapies (sAD). It is only with the introduction of the 
genetic protection category that the corollaries between these two cases become apparent. This 
underlines the need for a more sophisticated approach than is available in the binary 
therapy/enhancement account. In their report on human genome editing, the National Academies 
of Science suggest that the commonness, or frequency, of a converted sequence should play a role 
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in determinations of the permissibility of converting that sequence through genetic editing.13 
However, following our analysis, the commonness of a sequence should not be treated as an index 
of the justifiability of the intervention. Instead, the focus should be on the roles the pre- and post-
converted sequence play in causing or contributing to loss of normal functioning. 
 
Without the third category, genetic protection modifications are likely to be categorized as 
enhancements. This could hold back research into genetic protection and potentially have a 
significant negative impact on human lives. The genetic treatments affected might include those 
for mutations such as BRCA1/2, which also fall into the genetic protection category. While 
mutations in these genes increase the risk of an individual developing cancer by a significant 
amount (e.g. by the age of 80 there is a 69-72% risk of a woman having developed breast cancer 
and 17-44% risk of having developed ovarian cancer35), they do not count as a genetic disease in 
themselves. Rather they increase the risk of disease. In essence, because the variant is not 
completely penetrant, it cannot be said that a carrier of it is suffering from a disease until the 
individual is actually diagnosed with cancer. In practice, it is perhaps likely that the treatment of 
the mutation in the specific case of the BRCA1/2 would be considered a form of genetic therapy 
within the current therapy/enhancement model – essentially because of the very high risk of an 
affected individual developing the disease. However, on our analysis this would be an ad hoc 
solution, and one that would open the possibility of including any number of disease-disposing 
variants. Moreover, those whose thinking is guided by the current two-category model might well 
argue that in principle genetic modification of individuals with BRCA1/2 mutations ought to be 
classified as enhancements and therefore restricted. The potential for such unintuitive outcomes, 
and thus the need for ad hoc solutions, is in our view significant. The genetic protection model 
does not suffer from this issue. 
 
In short, then, if policy and regulation are based on the binary distinction between therapy and 
enhancement there is a risk either that research into areas such as sAD and BRCA1/2 mutation will 
be limited because they are classified as enhancement, or that ad hoc exceptions will have to be 
made to policies without a systematic basis. This could mean that research is limited, and 
treatments of widespread and life-altering or life-threatening diseases will not be developed. On 
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the other hand, if exemptions are made too freely there is a risk that genetic modifications could 
carry unforeseen moral costs including, but not limited to: unintended impacts on public health 
system costs or prioritization; social inequality due to lack of access to treatments; or increased 
valuation of humans based on individual traits rather than common origin. In extreme cases, such 
exemptions might even confer comparative advantage on recipients which directly disadvantage 
individuals without the modification. The genetic protection category makes it possible to 
maintain strict limits on enhancement proper, because modifications of disease-disposing variants 
are removed from this category and considered separately. Limitations on research and 
treatments for, for example, BRCA1/2 mutations can then be considered on their individual merits 
rather than as exceptions to general rules limiting enhancement. Ultimately, this should lead to 
better decision-making.  
 
It is also worth noting that genetic protection modifications present some unique ethical issues 
that are not found in traditional genetic enhancement or therapy. Since a therapy aims at disease 
variants, treatment of the variant itself is the only option for a cure. However, many 
environmental factors are often involved when a variant associated with disease develops into 
actual disease, and a significant number of these factors are associated with societal, economic 
and cultural disparities. In these cases, proponents of genetic modification should be aware that a 
“treatment solution” might serve only to mask what is really a consequence of social injustice or 
human suffering in general, especially because genetic protection modifications will in some cases 
be costly, dangerous, or invasive. Genetic protection modifications are intended to improve the 
lives of individuals, and in view of this a comprehensive assessment of the risks associated with 
genetic modification versus other treatment options should be carried out. As Erik Parens has 
pointed out, our possession of new medical means to reach our intended ends “may incline us to 
ignore the complex social roots of the suffering of individuals”.2 Seen through this lens, genetic 
protection modifications might have more in common with the types of preventative measures 
enacted through public health policy than they do with genetic therapy. While a genetic therapy 
aims to cure an existing disease, genetic protection modifications aim to prevent diseases from 
developing in the first place. Consequently, these modifications should be weighed against other 
preventative measures that might be taken with the same goal in mind. As pointed out above, in 
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the case of sAD it has been shown that diet, alcohol consumption and other factors all play a role 
in the risk of developing the disease, along with genetic factors.  
 
A successful response to these issues will provide a range of individual and societal benefits above 
and beyond mitigation of the risk of developing AD. Prima facie, this suggests that public health 
interventions should be prioritized over genetic protection modifications. However, this 
prioritization should be balanced against other concerns. Public health interventions are often 
criticized for being paternalistic in nature.36 They can require significant intervention in the lives of 
individuals and run counter to societal or cultural norms – an issue that is likely to be less serious 
when genetic protection treatments are used. Consequently, genetic protection modification 
should be seen as just one of a range of tools that can be employed to address the health and 
well-being of individuals, and a tool, moreover, that will need to be selectively employed based on 
the context and intended results. 
 
Current policy and public debate on genetic editing treatments often revolves around a binary 
distinction between therapy and enhancement, where the former is considered morally legitimate 
and the latter unethical. This distinction is also present in parts of the academic literature on the 
subject, although it has been subject to significantly more scrutiny here. While attempts have 
been made to move discussion away from this polarization, we suggest that a new three-category 
approach based on the notion of normal functioning would be fruitful. Such an approach would 
recognize the unique function of genetic variations that are not completely penetrant, and thus 
disease-disposing rather than disease-causing. These variants might very well offer the greatest 
potential for genetic treatment, yet the treatments in question cannot be properly categorized as 
therapy or enhancement (as they would need to be in the current dichotomy), nor are they readily 
accommodated in previous attempts to address prevention with the normal functioning account. 
On our account, the category of genetic therapy should cover treatments for disease-causing 
variants, while the category of enhancement should contain treatments that edit a healthy 
wildtype in order to engineer a superior variant. This leaves room for the novel genetic protection 
category we are proposing:  A category covering treatments that seek to edit disease-disposing 
variants in order to give individuals healthy wildtypes. This three-category approach would allow 
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society to regulate enhancements with a significant potential to disrupt or damage existing 
societal, economic or cultural structures rigorously, and to deal with the unique ethical challenges 
presented by genetic protection modifications separately.  
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